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SOME DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW CONCERNING
CONFESSIONS
WILLIAM WICKER*

Our system of administering criminal laws is predicated upon accusatorial rather than inquisitorial proceedings. To maintain inviolate the
safeguards consonant with this principle, we have placed upon the State an
ever-increasing burden in proving the commission of the crime charged. That
this burden has begun to weigh heavily, and perhaps onerously, becomes
unmistakably evident from a study of recent developments in the law of
confessions.
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Until the latter part of the seventeenth century, there were no English
rules limiting the conditions under which confessions could be introduced in
evidence.' Threats of physical violence, and even intense physical torture were
techniques i la mode in obtaining confessions admissible in evidence against
the confessor. During the eighteenth century, more civilized consideration
was shown criminal suspects. Rules were developed restricting, more and
more, the conditions under which confessions could be introduced in evidencea process which continued unabated for over a century. During the first
half of the nineteenth century, we find the English courts boldly severing
the few remaining strands. Lines of demarcation were summarily eradicated.
Every confession was looked upon with grave suspicion, and rejected upon
the slightest pretext.2 Then slowly the tide began to turn. In the present
century, the oscillation has been confined within a more limited rangeapproaching neither the flood of the 1600's, nor the ebb of the early nineteenth
century.
The extreme to which English judges of the first half of the 1800's
went in excluding confessions is somewhat difficult to explain. Court decisions of this period indicate a very special solicitude for confessed criminals.
Confessions were excluded where the only vitiating fact was advice to the
suspect to tell the truth, 3 or, anomalous as it may seem, a warning that what

he said would be used against him. 4 A brief outline of the background for these
*Dean, University of Tennessee College of Law.
1. 3 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 817 (3d ed. 1940). See also Gordons' Trial, 11 St. Tr. 46
(1680) ; Michel's Trial, 6 St. Tr. 1207, 1232 (1677); Tonge's Trial, 6 St. Tr. 226, 229
(1662).
2. 3 WIGMomE, EVIDENCE § 820 (3d ed. 1940).
3. Regina v. Hearn, Car. & M. 109, 174 Eng. Rep. 431 (N.P. 1841) ; Rex v. Enoch,
5 Car. & P. 539, 172 Eng. Rep. 1089 (N.P. 1833).
4. Regina v. Furley, 1 Cox. C.C. 76 (1844) ; Regina v. Harris, I Cox, C.C. 106 (1844).
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decisions will perhaps be an aid toward an understanding of the results reached
by the courts of this era. Mr. Wigmore mentions three possible explanatory
factors. 5 (1) The defendants in criminal cases came chiefly from the lower
English classes. Generally these classes were characterized by such a
subservient attitude toward those in authority that a mental condition was
created to which the judges hesitated to apply the test of rational principle.
(2) During the 1800's a defendant in a criminal case had no right of appeal.
Further, the law concerning confessions was largely the work of isolated trial
judges making rulings in the hurry of a trial without the benefit of consultation
with other judges. (3) During this period a defendant in a criminal case was
incompetent to testify as a witness for himself and had no right to be represented by counsel.
There were also other reasons which may in part explain the extreme
concern for the confessed criminal evinced by the English judges of that
period. The punishment fixed for those convicted of crime was especially
harsh, rigid and severe. There was little or no attempt at balancing the
gravity of the offense, or the circumstances of the particular case with the
corresponding punishment. Writing in 1819, Sir Thomas Buxton put the
then number of criminal offenses for which the statutory punishment was
death without benefit of clergy, at 223.6 The Director of Research in
Criminal Science of the University of Cambridge, in describing the English
criminal law system of the 1800's noted that "The other main characteristic
of this system was its rigidity. Practically no capital statute provided any
alternative to the death penalty. . . ."7 The poverty of the typical defendant
was an additional consideration. Ordinarily he had no money with which
to pay witness fees to those who had testimonal knowledge favorable to his
cause. In a case decided in 1852 Pollock, C. B., said, "generally a prisoner
has no means of paying for witnesses." 8
In view of such handicaps, a gamble on a half-promise by one in
authority, or submissive acquiescence in what the Crown deemed the best
interests of all concerned, would not seem an unreasonable choice on the part
of the typical defendant in early-nineteenth-century criminal proceedings.
THE PRINCIPLES SUPPORTING THE EXCLUSIONARY RULES

According to Mr. Wigmore, the sole principle behind twentieth century
exclusionary rules should be untrustworthiness, or more specifically, was the
inducement such as to involve a fair risk of a false confession ? In balancing
5. 3 WIGOMORE, EVnDENcE § 865 (3d ed. 1940).
6. Quoted in RADZiNOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAw 4 (1948).
7. Id. at 14.
8. Regina v. Baldry, 2 Den. 430, 443, 169 Eng. Rep. 568, 574 (C.C. 1852).
9. 3 WmaATORE, EVIDENCE § 822 (3d ed. 1940).
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the advantages of a false confession against the consequences of not confessing, even a reasonably prudent atomic-age man may, under very
exceptional circumstances, gamble in favor of a false confession. It is also
possible that a confession may be the product of a perverted mind, particularly
under the stimulus of lurid journalistic accounts of brutal crimes. Furthermore, the fear and excitement of a moron, suspected or accused of a repulsive
crime, may give rise to a delusion of guilt. Extreme fear and excitement
without restraint are said to have been the causes of the delusion of guilt
possessed by the ill-fated wretches who confessed to being witches at
Salem.' 0
Doubt as to trustworthiness is probably the chief principle behind the
present rules relating to confessions, but this is not the only principle. Another
basic determinant is the protection of the individual against physical and
psychological abuses inherent in the traditional "third degree." Mr. McCormick, in commenting on statements prevalent in a high percentage of
confession cases to the effect that a confession must be "voluntary" to be
admissible, made the following suggestion:
"It well may be that the adherence of the courts to this form of statement of the
confession-rule in terms of 'voluntariness' is prompted not only by a liking for its

convenient brevity, but also by a recognition that there is an interest here to be

protected closely akin to the interest of a witness or of an accused person which is
protected with a privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.""

Under this principle the protection of the privilege of the individual to
be free from illegal coercive police pressures may justify a rejection for
courtroom use of a confession which would otherwise be relevant and competent. This certainly is one of the immediate objectives. A long-range objective is discouragement of future official misconduct by refusing to permit
courtroom use of the fruits of past misconduct of police officers.
The typical contemporary judicial opinion in this field states that a
confession must be "voluntary" in order to be admissible. All conscious
declarations are "voluntary" in the sense of a choice between alternatives.
However, the word "voluntary" as used in the confession cases does not
mean that there is no choice between alternatives. Even in a coerced confession there is a choice. The vitiating fact is not the absence of choice
but the fact that both alternatives have disagreeable consequences. In the
confession cases the word "voluntary" seems to mean merely that the confession was improperly induced. The general principles involved seem to be
10. MUNSTERBERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND
SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF §§ 273-77 (3d ed. 1937).

145-48 (1930);

see also

WIGMORE,

11. McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 16 TEXAS L. Ray.
447, 452-53 (1938) ; see also McCormick, Some Problems and Developments in the

Admissibility of Confessions, 24

TEXAS

L. RE,. 239 (1946).
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that confessions are excluded if obtained under circumstances which are
deemed to render them untrustworthy, or if they are "involuntary" in the
sense that they have been improperly induced.
The question, whether a confession was obtained under circumstances
which are likely to produce a false confession or was otherwise improperly
induced, is a preliminary question as to the admissibility of evidence to be
decided by the judge. Testimony at the preliminary hearing need not be taken
in the presence of a jury, as the jury has nothing to do with the initial
ruling on admissibility. Generally, the jury never hears a confession which
the judge excludes as having been improperly obtained. If the confession
is admitted in evidence, the older, and perhaps the sounder view, makes the
trial judge's ruling as to the propriety of its use as evidence a definite direction.' 2 A majority of the recent cases, however, disapprove of that view and
hold that if the judge admits a confession he must instruct the jury not to consider it as evidence against the defendant unless the jury find the confession
not improperly induced.'3
The courts, both state and federal, are now in general accord in
excluding confessions which the police have obtained by physical violence or by
threats of physical violence.' 4 Recent developments and variations from
the run-of-the-mill confession decision include those relating to pre-arraignment incommunicado interrogation, prolonged interrogation as a violation of
due process, a confession recorded on sound film, and pre-indictment suppression of a confession.
PREARRAIGN MENT INCOM.MUNICADO

INTERROGATION

Interrogation immediately after arrest gives an innocent person an

early opportunity to tell his story and clear himself. Interrogation promptly
after arrest is also an aid in securing a confession. It is at this time that
the psychological pressure of a relentless conscience is at its height, and the
prisoner most apt to feel his position hopeless. The urge to "make a clean
12. Ray v. State, 29 Ala. App. 382, 197 So. 70 (1941) ; State v. McCarthy, 133 Conn.
171, 49 A.2d 594 (1946) ; State v. Cole, 136 N.J.L. 606, 56 A.2d 898 (1948) ; Wynn v.
State, 181 Tenn. 325, 181 S.W.2d 332 (1944).
13. State v. Smith, 62 Ariz. 145, 155 P.2d 622 (1945) ; Burton v. State, 204 Ark. 548,
163 S.W.2d 160 (1942); People v. Fox, 25 Cal.2d 330, 153 P.2d 729 (1944) ; Garrett
v. State, 203 Ga. 756, 48 S.E.2d 377 (1948) ; State v. Webb, 239 Iowa 693, 31 N.W.2d
337 (1948); Smith v. State, 189 Md. 596, 56 A.2d 818 (1948); Commonwealth v.
Sheppard, 313 Mass. 590, 48 N.E.2d 630 (1943): State v. Schabert, 218 Minn. 1, 15
N.W.2d 585 (1944) ; Cramer v. State, 145 Neb. 88, 15 N.V.2d 323 (1944) ; People v.
Mleczko, 298 N.Y. 153, 81 N.E.2d 65 (1948); Commonwealth v. Chavis, 357 Pa. 158,
53 A.2d 96 (1947) ; State v. Gidron, 211 S.C. 360, 45 S.E.2d 587 (1947) ; Newman v.
State, 148 Tex. Cr. 645, 187 S.W.2d 559 (1945) : State v. Van Brunt, 22 Wasb.2d 103, 154
P.2d 606 (1944).
14. See the cases collected in Note, 24 A.L.R. 703 (1923).
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breast" of the whole affair is likely to subside after the intervention of
counsel or friends, or the passage of time.
The Federal Government and nearly all of the states have statutes
requiring prompt arraignment of a suspect after his arrest. 15 The language
used in these statutes includes such expressions as "immediately," "forthwith," "without delay," and analogous terminology indicating that an
arraignment promptly upon arrest is mandatory and not merely directory.
The objectives of prompt-arraignment statutes include giving the suspect
a preliminary hearing before a committing official, informing him as to his
constitutional privilege of remaining silent, and affording hiun an opportunity
to obtain counsel and secure bail. Holding the suspect incommunicado
furnishes the setting most favorable for obtaining a confession. A high
percentage of improperly induced confessions occur while the suspect is
being held "on ice" in violation of arraignment statutes.16 This kind of
violation of a duty towards a suspect involves very little risk from the standpoint of the lawless police officer. A prosecuting attorney will very seldom, if
ever, use a confession obtained by his investigating officer and then prosecute
the officer for illegally obtaining the confession. Furthermore, even a
successful criminal prosecution gives no redress to the victim. There are
also obvious practical obstacles to a convicted criminal's successfully maintaining a civil suit for damages against an officer who illegally detained him
and thereby obtained the evidence to convict him. If the victim dares to
bring a civil action, he is not only faced with publicity and the risk of wasting
time and money, but also with the risk of creating such a degree of ill-feeling
between himself and the police that he may have reason to fear police
retribution. If the victim obtains a judgment, the damages may be nominal.
Even if the victim obtains a substantial judgment, it often cannot be collected
out of a police officer's meager resources.
The interest of the individual in possessing an effective remedy for a
violation of his rights and privileges under an arraignment statute, and the
interest of the public in preserving an effective method of obtaining effective
evidence, are conflicting interests presenting problems difficult to reconcile.
Yet, apparently there is not even a dictum in any reported case decided
prior to 1943, suggesting that failure to comply with the requirements of a
prompt arraignment statute requires the exclusion of a confession obtained
during violation thereof.
15. For a list of the federal statutes and also of the various state statutes see

McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 342, 63 Sup. Ct. 608, 87 L. Ed. 819 (1943);

and Note, Illegal Detention and the Admissibility of Confessions, 53 YALE L.J. 758, 759
(1944). See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 11515, 11544 (Williams 1934).

16.

MENT

REPORT OF THE NATIONAL

COM-MISSION

ON

LAW

OBSERVANCE

AND

ENFORCE-

5, 33, 210 (1931) ; Fraenkel, From Suspicion to Accusation, 51 YALE L.J. 748, 759

(1942).
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In 1943 the United States Supreme Court decided McNabb v. United
States.17 In that case the defendants were convicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee for the murder of an
officer of the Federal Alcohol Tax Unit. The convictions were based largely
on confessions admitted in evidence over the objection that they were unlawfully secured by federal officers. Justice Frankfurter stated the circumnstances under which the confessions were secured and the consequences of
those circumstances as follows:
"The circumstances in which the statements admitted in evidence against the
petitioners were secured reveal a plain disregard of the duty enjoyed by Congress
upon Federal law officers. Freeman and Raymond McNabb were arrested in the
middle of the night at their home. Instead of being brought before a United States
Commissioner or a judicial officer, as the law requires, in order to determine the
sufficiency of the justification for their detention, they were put in a barren cell and
kept there for fourteen hours. For two days they were subjected to unremitting
questioning by numerous officers. Benjamin's confession was secured by detaining him
unlawfully and questioning him continuously for five or six hours. The McNabbs had
to submit to all this without the aid of friends or the benefit of counsel. The record
leaves no room for doubt that the questioning of the petitioners took place while they
were in the custody of the arresting officers and before any order of commitment was
made. Plainly, a conviction resting on evidence secured through such a flagrant
disregard of the procedure which Congress has commanded cannot be allowed to
stand without making the courts themselves accomplices in willful disobedience of law.
Congress has not explicitly forbidden the use of evidence so procured. But to permit
such evidence to be made the basis of a conviction in the Federal courts would
stultify the policy which Congress has enacted into law."'"

The above extract from Justice Frankfurter's opinion in the McNabb case,
in stressing both the unlawful detention and the coercive effects of prolonged
incommunicado questioning of suspects, was disturbing, unsettling and

confusing, especially to federal law-enforcing officers.

There was a variety

of disagreement as to the changes, if any, which this case made necessaryin the criminal interirogation practices of federal officers.
There were
differences of opinion as to which of the two factors was determinative in the
exclusion of the confession and which, if either, was only make-weight dictum.

Were the confessions excluded because of the length of the period between
arrest and arraignment, or because of the length of the period of incommunicado interrogation?
a confession?

Or must both periods be lengthy in order to exclude

17. 318 U.S. 332, 63 Sup. Ct. 608, 87 L. Ed. 819 (1943).
18. 318 U.S. at 344-45. Justice Reed dissented and Justice Rutledge did not
participate in this decision. It is perhaps worth noting that the McNabbs had been
promptly arraigned and that there had been no violation of the arraignment statute.
The record before the United States District Court did not disclose that fact and
Justice Frankfurter erroneously assumed that there had been such a violation. See
the opinion of Circuit Judge Hicks affirming the conviction of the McNabbs at the
second trial. McNabb v. United States, 142 F.2d 904 (6th Cir. 1944).

CONFESSIONS
United States v. Anderson19 also involved unlawful detention without
physical violence and protracted questioning of defendants while being held
incommunicado. It is too similar on its facts to shed much light on the confusing McNabb case.
The next confession case to come before the Supreme Court was United
States v. Mitchell.20 In this case the defendant confessed within a few minutes
after arrest and prior to the time when the arresting officials were required to
arraign him. In violation of the statute he was held eight days after his
confession before he was arraigned. The Supreme Court held that a confession made during a period of legal detention should not be excluded on
account of a subsequent unwarranted delay in arraignment. The majority
opinion in the Mitchell case, by way of dictum, commented on the McNabb
case as follows: "Inexcusable detention ...

and the successful extraction of

such inculpatory statements by continuous questioning for many hours under
psychological pressure were the decisive features in the McNabb case. .... ,,21
In view of this dictum putting the rationale of the McNabb case on
dual grounds, and the holding admitting a confession obtained after brief
interrogation though accompanied by a relatively long and illegal postconfession detention, some of the lower federal courts interpreted the McNabb
case, as explained by the Mitchell case, to mean that the length of the interrogation was the more important criterion rather than the length of the period
between arrest and arraignment.22
The case of Upshawv v. United States,2 3 decided by the Supreme Court
in 1948, reversed this trend of thought and cleared up some of the confusion
following in the wake of the McNabb, Anderson and Mitchell cases. In the
Upshaw case defendant confessed prior to arraignment and after being
questioned six times during the first 30 hours of his detention. 24 However,
these question periods were not over 30 minutes each and there was never more
than one officer participating in a single question period. Defendant was
arrested on Friday but was not araigned until the following Monday. The
only reason given for the delay in arraignment was that there was not enough
evidence to hold the defendant and the police wanted to question him further.
'19. 318 U.S. 350, 63 Sup. Ct. 599, 87 L. Ed. 829 (1943).

two justices did not participate in this decision.

20. 322 U.S. 65, 64 Sup. Ct. 896, 88 L. Ed. 1140 (1944).

Justice Reed dissented ind
Three justices concurred

in the result and Justice Black dissented.

21. 322 U.S. at 67.
22. Alderman v. United States, 165 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1947) ; Brinegar v. United

States, 165 F.2d 512 (10th Cir. 1947); Ruhl v. United States, 148 F.2d 173 (10th Cir.

1945).

23. 335 U.S. 410, 69 Sup. Ct. 170, 93 L. Ed. 100 (1948) (5-to-4 decision).
24. See both the majority and dissenting opinions when the case was in tie Circuit
Court of Appeals. Upshaw v. United States, 168 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
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The Supreme Court held the confession inadmissible on the ground that it was
obtained while the prompt-arraignment statute was being violated. Justice
Black, in the majority opinion said: ".

.

. a confession is inadmissible if made

during illegal detention due to the failure promptly to carry a prisoner before
a committing magistrate, whether or not 'the confession is the result of torture,
physical or psychological.' 25
This language in the Upshaw case and the actual holding in the case indicate that a majority of the Supreme Court, as then constituted, was firmly
committed to the doctrine that a confession, though in all other respects
properly obtained, should be excluded if obtained while the confessor is being
detained in violation of an arraignment statute.
It would appear therefore, under the McNabb rule as modified by the
Upshaw case, that the question, whether a confession is "voluntary," or
whether it is "trustworthy," is no longer the sole test of admissibility in the
federal courts. If a confession is improperly obtained, in that it is secured
while the confessor is being illegally detained, it is inadmissible. The rationale
of this new federal rule is that of implementing the otherwise unenforcible
arraignment statutes by giving to a prisoner, whose rights and privileges
thereunder have been violated, the remedy of barring the evidence secured
in such a manner, thereby depriving federal law-enforcing officers of the
fruits of their wrongdoing. The fact that confessions which are inadmissible
often furnish excellent leads whereby the police can secure evidence that is
admissible, militates somewhat against the effectiveness of the defendant's
remedy under the new rules and relieves some of the pressure which that
rule places upon federal officers to comply with prompt arraignment statutes.
United States v. Carignan,20 decided on November 13, 1951, held that the
McNabb rule does not bar the introduction of a confession made while the
confessor is in lawful custody for a crime other than the one to which he
confesses. In the Carignan case the defendant was arrested in the Territory
of Alaska by a United States marshal. He was promptly arraigned under
a charge of assault with intent to rape. While lawfully detained tinder the
assault charge, he confessed to the commission of another crime, an earlier
unsolved murder. The Untied States Supreme Court held by a 5-to-3 decision that the defendant's confessions did not fall within the judicially
created rule of evidence formulated in the Mll cNabb case, as it was not obtained
during unlawful detention. Justice Reed in the prevailing opinion declared
that to extend the McNabb rule to cover this case "would accentuate the
shift of the inquiry as to admissibility from the voluntariness of the confession to the legality of the arrest and restraint. .
25. 335 U S. at 413.
26. 342 U.S. 36, 72 Sup. Ct. 97 (1951).

.

. An extension of a
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mechanical rule based on the time of a confession would not be a helpful
addition to the rules of criminal evidence."' 27 justices Douglas, Black and
Frankfurter took the view that arrest and arraignment for one crime and the
use of this lawful detention to investigate a wholly different crime should be
treated like detention without arraignment and the confession of the other
crime should be excluded.
Usually arraignment for one crime gives some protection against improper
interrogation for another crime. Ordinarily, arraignment gives a defendant
opportunities to learn of his constitutional privilege of remaining silent and
of his right to talk with friends and to employ counsel. The refusal of a
majority of the Justices of the Supreme Court to extend the mechanical
McNabb rule to cover the Carignancase is a step in the direction of increasing
the efficiency of federal law-enforcing officers without unduly encroaching on
procedural safeguards.
The McNabb rule applies only to federal officers and cases tried in the
United States district courts. In the McNabb, Mitchell and Upshaw cases
the Supreme Court was exercising its supervisory power over lower federal
courts and was not promulgating a new requirement of procedural due
process which state courts would have to follow.
The McNabb rule as modified by the Upshaw case, to the effect that a
confession is inadmissible if obtained while the confessor was being detained
in violation of arraignment statutes, has not met with much favor in the state
courts. In fact, courts other than the federal courts have repeatedly refused
to follow that rule.2 8 Among the reasons given for refusal to follow the
McNabb rule are: "Society, as well as this defendant, is entitled to equal
-29 "Adherence to such a rule would . . place unprotection of the law ....
necessary obstacles in the way of the detection of crime and result in the
'8 0
acquittal of many a guilty man."
PROLONGED INTERROGATION AS A VIOLATION OF

DUE PROCESS

The United States Supreme Court has general supervisory power over
all cases tried in the United States district courts, but has no such broad
27. 342 U.S. at 45.

28. State v. Browning, 206 Ark. 791, 178 S.W.2d 77 (1944); People v. Nagle,

25 Cal.2d 216, 153 P.2d 344 (1944) ; Finley v. State, 153 Fla. 394, 14 So.2d 844 (1943) ;
Coker v. State, 199 Ga. 20, 33 S.E.2d 171 (1945); People v. Thomlison, 400 Ill. 555,
81 N.E.2d 434 (1948) ; Commonwealth v. Mabry, 299 Mass. 96, 12 N.E.2d 61 (1937) :
State v. Ellis, 354 Mo. 998, 193 S.W.2d 31 (1946) ; State v. Thompson, 227 N.C. 19, 40
S.E.2d 620 (1946); State v. Bunk, 4 N.J. 461, 73 A.2d 249 (1950); State v. Folkes,

174 Ore. 568, 150 P.2d 17 (1944); McGhee v. State, 183 Tenn. 20, 189 S.W.2d 826
(1945). Some of these cases and others to the same effect are collected in Note, 19
A.L.R.2d 1331 (1951).
29. State v. Zukauskas, 132 Conn. 450, 460, 45 A.2d 289, 293 (1945).
30. State v. Folkes, 174 Ore. 568, 624, 150 P.2d 17, 38 (1944).
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power over cases tried in the state courts. However, the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived "of
life, liberty or property without due process of law." In 1936, in Brown v.
Mississippi,3' the Supreme Court made its first pronouncement on due process
with respect to the use of confessions in state courts. In the Brown case three
ignorant Negroes were convicted of murder solely on confessions admittedly
obtained from them by physical torture. The Supreme Court reversed on
the ground that the use of confessions unlawfully obtained by physical torture
was a violation of due process of law.
In Lisenba v. California,3 2 the defendant was an intelligent man with considerable business experience. He appeared at ease, cool and collected, at
the time of his confession. A majority of the United States Supreme Court
found no violation of procedural due process by the California courts, although
defendant had been held incommunicado in violation of arraignment laws and
subjected to protracted questioning. Justice Roberts, speaking for the
majority, said:
"The aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude presumptively false
evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence whether true
or false .... If, by fraud, collusion, trickery and subornation of perjury on the part
of those representing the state, the trial of an accused person results in his conviction,
he has been denied due process of law. The case stands no better if, by the same
devices, a confession is procured, and used in the trial.'

In Ward v. Te.,ras, 34 an ignorant Negro was taken into custody and
transported to eight different localities in surrounding counties.

He was

questioned continuously and was informed of threats of mob violence. After
one and a half days of such treatment he confessed. The confession was
admitted. Without it the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction
of murder. The State contended that whether the confession was coerced or
voluntary had already been determined by the trial judge and by the jury
and that this determination, affirmed by the Supreme Court of Texas, should
not be disturbed. The United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction
on the ground that the use of this confession was a denial of due process.
In the Brown, Lisenba and Ward cases the Supreme Court took into
consideration such factors as the race, the education and the intelligence of
the defendant in determining whether prolonged questioning by state
officers coerced the confession. In Ashcraft v. Temtessee,3 1 the majority
31. 297 U.S. 278, 56 Sup. Ct. 461, 80 L. Ed. 682 (1936).

32. 314 U.S. 219, 62 Sup. Ct. 280, 86 L. Ed. 166 (1941) (7-to-2 decision).
33. 314 U.S. at 236, 237.
34. 316 U.S. 547, 62 Sup. Ct. 1139, 86 L. Ed. 1663 (1942).
35. 322 U.S. 143, 64 Sup. Ct. 921, 88 L. Ed. 1192 (1944)

(6-to-3 decision).
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of the Supreme Court placed the emphasis on the length of the period of
continuous questioning. Little weight was given to race, education and
intelligence. One paragraph of the dissenting opinion by Justice Jackson
follows:
"This is not the case of an ignorant and unrepresented defendant who has been the
victim of prejudice. Ashcraft was a white man of good reputation, good position, and

substantial property. For a week after this crime was discovered he was not detained,
although his stories to the officers did not hang together, but was at large, free to
consult his friends and counsel. There was no indecent haste, but on the contrary
evident deliberation, in suspecting and accusing him. He was not sentenced to death,
but for a term that probably means life. He was defended by resourceful and diligent
counsel."'

The facts of the Ashcraft case can be briefly stated. About a week after
the murder was committed Ashcraft was arrested. His confession came after
an incommunicado period of 36 hours. Interrogation was continuous and
by relays of trained investigators. The question whether the confession was
voluntary was put to the jury and the jury returned a verdict of guilty.
The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed the conviction. On certiorari, the
United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction on the ground that 36
hours of continuous questioning was inherently coercive as a matter of law,
and the use of a confession thereby obtained violated due process.
In Haley v. Ohio,37 the defendant was a 15-year-old Negro boy and a
senior in high school. He confessed after five hours of questioning by relays
of policemen. He was not informed of his right to counsel nor of his privilege
to refuse to answer. Arraignment did not take place until three days after
his confession. The confviction was upheld by the Ohio Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court of Ohio. The United States Supreme Court reversed on
the ground that the confession was coerced and its admission in evidence a
violation of due process.
The time factor is not the only one involved in determining the point
at which police interrogation violates due process. It is worth noting, however,
that the Ashcraft case held that there was such violation in a case involving
36 hours of continuous incommunicado interrogation of an intelligent adult,
and the Haley case found such violation in a case involving five hours of
continuous incommunicado interrogation of an intelligent 15-year-old boy.
In 1949 the Supreme Court in three companion cases38 held that the use
of certain confessions in murder trials in the state courts of Indiana, Pennsyl36. 322 U.S. at 173-74.
37. 332 U.S. 596, 68 Sup. Ct. 302, 92 L. Ed. 224 (1948)

(5-to-4 decision).

38. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 69 Sup. Ct. 1347, 93 L. Ed. 1801 (1949) (6-to-3

decision) ; Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62, 69 Sup. Ct. 1352, 93 L. Ed. 1810 (1949)

(5-to-4 decision) ; Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68, 69 Sup. Ct. 1354, 93 L. Ed.
1815 (1949) (5-to-4 decision).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL,. 5

vania and South Carolina violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and in all three cases reversed the convictions. Among the facts
common to the three cases were the following: The murder was unwitnessed.
There were reasonable grounds for suspecting the defendant. The defendant
was arrested, but instead of being brought promptly before a committing
magistrate as required by state law, he was held by the police until prolonged
questioning resulted in a confession. Prior to the confession defendant did
not have counsel nor was he advised of his right thereto. Preconfession
questioning was by officers working in relays. The confession so obtained was
admitted in evidence. Defendant was convicted by a jury and the highest
court of the state affirmed the conviction.
The prearraignment detention period varied from three days in the South
Carolina case, to seven days in the Indiana case. The number of preconfession
questioning periods was four in the South Carolina case, five in the Pennsylvania case, and six in the Indiana case. The length of each of these periods
varied from three to six hours in the Indiana and Pennsylvania cases, and
from one to eleven hours in the South Carolina case.
In Watts v. Indiana Mr. Justice Frankfurter said:
"In the petitioner's statement there was an acknowledgment of the possession of an
incriminating gun, the existence of which the police independently established. But a
coerced confession is inadmissible under the Due Process Clause even though statements
in it may be independently established as true....
"When a suspect speaks because he is overborne, it is immaterial whether he has been
subjected to a physical or a mental ordeal. Eventual yielding to questioning under such
circumstances is plainly the product of the suction process of interrogation and therefore
the reverse of voluntary. We would have to shut our minds to the plain significance
of what here transpired to deny that this was a calculated endeavor to secure a
confession through the pressure of unrelenting interrogation.

The very relentlessness

of such interrogation implies that it is better for the prisoner to answer than to persist
in the refusal of disclosure which is his constitutional right. To turn the detention
of an accused into a process of wrenching from him evidence which could not be
extorted in open court with all its safeguards, is so grave an abuse of the power of
'
arrest as to offend the procedural standards of due process.

Apparently the phrase "suction process," as used by Justice Frankfurter,
signifies conditions which induce a suspect to confess because of physical or
mental fatigue or fear. His statement that a coerced confession is inadmissible
under the due process clause even though it is corroborated by other credible
and admissible evidence indicates that the purpose of the decision is to
protect a defendant from coercive practices, regardless of the truth or falsity
of the confession thereby obtained. In a concurring opinion in Watts v.
Indiana Justice Douglas said:
39. 338 U.S. at 50 n.2, 53-54.
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"The man was held until he broke. Then and only then was he arraigned and
given the protection which the law provides all accused. Detention without arraignment
is a time-honored method for keeping an accused under the exclusive control of the
police. They can then operate at their leisure. The accused is wholly at their
mercy. He is without the aid of counsel or friends; and he is denied the protection
of the magistrate. We should unequivocally condemn the procedure and stand ready
to outlaw, as we did in Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, and Haley v. Ohio, 332
U.S. 596, any confession obtained during the period of the unlawful detention. The
It is the procedure
procedure breeds coerced confessions. It is the root of the evil.
'
without which the inquisition could not flourish in the country." "
The attitude of Justice Douglas in advocating that state courts be
required to outlaw "any confession obtained during the period of unlawful
detention" is in substance the McNabb doctrine, which is now applicable
only to criminal cases tried in the United States district courts. Fortunately
perhaps, the other justices of the Supreme Court have shown no inclination
to force that doctrine upon state courts by making it a requirement of
41
procedural due process. In Gallegos v. Nebraska, the Supreme Court
held, with only two judges dissenting, that it is 'not a violation of due
process to admit in a state court a confession made during illegal detention
due to a failure to comply with state law requiring a prisoner to be brought
promptly before a committing magistrate. The state courts have repeatedly
42
refused to follow voluntarily the McNabb doctrine. The general attitude of
most of the state court judges appears to be that (1) the McNabb doctrine
goes too far in the direction of excluding evidence of high probative value,
the admission of which is more important to the State in the administration
of justice than indirect punishment of police officers for improper interrogation practices, and (2) the conventional test of a confession's admissibility,
namely, whether it is voluntary and trustworthy, is all that is needed to safeguard the interests of the innocent.
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court concerning procedural
due process in obtaining confessions indicate a commendable concern with the
rights of the individual and a sincere desire to improve current practices of
interrogating suspects. The unexpressed attitude on the part of the Supreme
Court may be that there is' clear and present danger of both actual and
threatened violence and that secret interrogation by police officers usually
involves an implied threat of violence, if interrogation alone does not produce
the desired confession. 43 However, according to an outstanding authority
40. Id. at 57.
41. 342 U.S. 55, 72 Sup. Ct. 141 (1951).
42. See cases, supra note 28.
43. The recent case of Rochin v. California, 72 Sup. Ct. 205 (1952), involves police
violence which Justice Frankfurter characterizes as physical abuse of defendant that
"shocks the conscience," offends "a sense of justice," runs counter to "the decencies of
civilized conduct" and is "offensive to human dignity." In the Rochin case state
officers saw the defendant swallow two capsules. They arrested the defendant,
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in the field of criminal investigation, a majority of the justices of the Supreme
Court have understimated the importance of the following three practical
considerations:
"1. Many criminal cases, even when investigated by the best qualified police departments, are capable of solution only by means of an admission or confession from the
guilty individual or upon the basis of information obtained from the questioning of other
criminal suspects.
"2. Criminal offenders, except, of course, those caught in the commission of their
crimes, ordinarily will not admit their guilt unless questioned under conditions of
privacy, and for a period of perhaps several hours.
"3. In dealing with criminal offenders, and consequently also with criminal suspects
who may actually be innocent, the interrogat
must of necessity employ less refined
methods than are considered appropriate for the transaction of ordinary, everyday
affairs by and between law-abiding citizens.""
An unfortunate effect of the Supreme Court decisions concerning confessions and procedural due process is that state police officers are now
left in a quandary as to the limits within which they may question suspects.
Perhaps the best advice to law-enforcing officers is to have relatively short
interrogation periods interspersed with relatively long rest periods, and to
arraign a suspect shortly after the arrest, even though that probably means that
the suspect will obtain a lawyer who is practically certain to advise his client
to make no statement to the police under any circumstances. Perhaps the best
advice that can be given to lawyers after state court remedies have been
exhausted is to file a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme
Court in every case of conviction based even in part upon a disputed confession
obtained by police interrogation.
A CONFESSION RECORDED ON SOUND FILM
In some instances confessions taken by the police have been recorded on
sound film. In People v. Hayes,4 5 the defendant appealed from a conviction
of manslaughter and contended that the trial court committed error in permitting his confession to be reproduced for the jury through the medium of a
sound moving picture.
viction follows:

One paragraph of th6 opinion affirming this con-

handcuffed him and took him to a hospital where he was forced to open his mouth and
submit to "stomach pumping." As a result of this abuse the capsules were recovered
and were later found to contain narcotic. The Supreme Court held that admitting the
capsules in evidence, over the defendant's objection, was a violation of the due process
clause. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for a majority of the Supreme Court, said: "It
would be a stultification of the responsibility which the course of constitutional history
has cast upon this Court to hold that in order to convict a man the police cannot extract
by force what is in his mind but can extract what is in his stomach." 72 Sup. Ct. at 210.
44. Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in the United States Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L.
REv. 442, 447 (1948).
45. 21 Cal. App.2d 320, 71 P.2d 321 (1937). See also to the same effect Commonwealth v. Roller, 100 Pa. Super. 125 (1930), af'g 13 Pa. D. & C. 332 (1930).
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"This particular case well illustrates the advantage to be gained by courts' utilizing
modern methods of science in ascertaining facts. The objection is frequently heard
in criminal trials that a defendant's confession has not been freely and voluntarily
made, he testifying that it was induced either by threats or force or under the hope
or promise of immunity or reward, which is denied by witnesses on behalf of the
People. When a confession is presented by means of a movietone the trial court is
enabled to determine more accurately the truth or falsity of such claims and rule
accordingly."
Obviously, the danger of visible "third degree" grilling and other forms
of coercion is lessened if the confession is to be presented to the jury in the
form of a moving and talking picture of the defendant taken while making the
confession. Competent operators using proper equipment can reproduce by
sound film an unimpeachable facsimile of visible and audible interrogation
practices. However, there can be no reproduction of the effect upon the
defendant's mind of all the attendant circumstances. Nor can a sound motion
picture indicate what was said and done to induce the confession prior to
the filming.47 For example, there may have been an adequate rest period
between the "softening up" period and the period of the filming of the
picture. However, though this technique cannot demonstrate conclusively
that a confession was properly obtained, it may be a very important contributing factor in reaching that conclusion.
M'r. Wigmore states that an adequate apparatus for recording confessions
on sound film can be bought for $500, or less-a sum within the budget
of any police department. He recommends the promulgation of a Rule of
Court to the effect that no confession made to the police or a prosecuting
officer shall be received in evidence unless it has been recorded on sound film.
He believes that such a requirement will eliminate most of the current abuses
involved in continuous interrogation by relays of police officers.4 s
In most of the cases involving contested confessions there is a direct
conflict in the evidence, either as to the conditions inducing the confession or
as to the words spoken by the defendant and his interrogators. In view of the
rapid development of sound motion pictures and their remarkable accuracy
in depicting conditions and recording words, the court should keep the law
abreast of science and industry by encouraging the adoption of the practice
of recording confessions on sound films and the showing of these films to the
jury.4 9 This new technique which science and inventive genius have placed
at the disposal of law-enforcing officers will tend to demonstrate in many cases
either that the defendant is an out-and-out perjurer, or the confession was
in fact coerced.
46. 71 P.2d at 323.
47. MORGAN AND MAGUIRE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 117-18 (3d ed. 1951).

48. 3 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE §§ 833, 851 (3d ed. 1940) ; id. § 851a (Supp. 1951).
49. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 505, p. 243 (1942).
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PREINDICTMENT SUPPRESSION OF A CONFESSION

The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide for motions in advance
of the trial for the return of tangible objects unlawfully seized and for the
suppression of their use as evidence.50 There are no provisions in these rules
for pretrial suppression of unlawfully obtained confessions. However, in
1947 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in the
case of In re Fried,51 held, by a two-to-one decision, that a United States
district judge should hold a hearing on a request by suspects to suppress a
written confession alleged to have been obtained by coercion in violation
of the Fifth Amendment, although the suspects had not yet been indicted.
This case also held that if such a violation is proved, a preindictment order
suppressing the confession should issue. In the Fried case the suspects
alleged that they were held in custody without arraignment and without being
permitted to employ counsel, and that they signed the confessions which they
asked to have suppressed prior to any indictment only after prolonged periods
of third degree grilling.
The procedure indicated in the Fried case may be highly advantageous to
a suspect. It allows him to suppress in advance of indictment a confession
obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment, thereby keeping this evidence
from the grand jury. An indictment based upon evidence which cannot be
used at the trial may unnecessarily damage the reputation of a suspect. It
will often cause him to be confined while awaiting trial. It will put him
to the expense of defending himself. Even the quashing of an indictment at
a later date or a verdict of not guilty at the trial does not completely remove
the stigma, nor the adverse publicity incident to indictment. "Even to be
acquitted may damage one's good name if the community receives the verdict
with a wink and chooses to remember defendant as one who ought to have
been convicted."' 52 Furthermore, an innocent defendant has no redress for the
mental strain and the loss of time and money resulting from an unsuccessful
prosecution.
Preindictment suppression of an inadmissible confession may also be for
the best interest of the government. Where the principal basis for prosecution is a confession and there is a reasonable doubt as to whether it was
properly induced, the district attorney should welcome an opportunity to test
its admissibility in advance of the trial. A preindictment finding of inadmissibility may save time, effort and money in preparing the case for indictment
and trial.
50. FaD. R. CRIm. P. 41(e).
51. 161 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1947).

52. Justice Jackson in Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 482, 69 Sup. Ct.
213, 93 L. Ed. 168 (1948).

